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Abstract
This paper discusses the results of a research study in the use of architectures in government agencies. The
paper uses archival and time line analysis to present the context for securing the vast stores of protected
government information, including the actions taken by the Australian government leading into the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001 (termed 9/11), and the government reactions post 9/11. The results show that at the
strategic level, the Australian government commenced a process of examining information security
vulnerabilities and establishing a security architecture only to terminate the initiative due to a lack of budgetary
funding. Also, a qualitative research method was used to examine the security architecture implemented in a
large government agency. Results from the agency case study demonstrate that security architectures form part
of the fabric of the agency’s business, not only in terms of information and communications technology
infrastructure, but also staff behaviours and attitudes to securing information stores and exchanges.
Keywords
Security, architecture, government, information, standards.

INTRODUCTION
This study has been motivated by the researchers’ interest in the collection, processing and securing of sensitive
information within federal government agencies, and specifically what architectural measures are being
implemented to protect this information. A review of internationally recognised information security standards
and practices shows that codes of practice for information security management (ISO/IEC 17799:2000) and
specifications for information security management systems (BS 7799-2:2002) have been developed, and are in
widespread use. This investigation forms part of a larger doctoral study of government enterprise architectures
and is aimed at all government employees and researchers. The structure of this paper is outlined as follows.
The first section provides a structured summary of the international information security management standards
and details of specific case studies where organisations have implemented the ISO 17799 and BS 7799-2
standards. This paper will look to identify how the Australian federal government sought to implement the
principles embedded in these information security standards in the years leading up to the tragic events of 9/11,
and the strengthening of those implementation measures post 9/11. Also, the paper will present the standardsdriven information security architecture implemented within the Centrelink social services agency.
The second section outlines the research question and model that have been developed for the study. The
research question is focused on determining the requirement for protecting and securing information in the
government environment, and the type of security framework available for deployment. The research context
model was developed using the Zachman Enterprise Architecture Framework (Sowa and Zachman 1992) and
includes the contextual conditions to whole-of-government information security, and the information security
management frameworks that can be deployed by agencies for secure information exchange.
The third section outlines the research methodology used in the study. The first part of the study was undertaken
using archival research and time line analysis techniques to identify the key information security actions and
measures implemented by the Australian federal government prior to, and post, 9/11. The second part of the
study used qualitative research techniques to develop a concentrated case study of the security architecture
implementation at Centrelink. The research used unstructured interview commentaries (recorded in field note
format) and agency documents in developing the case (Burgelman 1983, 1994; Eisenhardt 1989). The senior
executive responsible for the information security architecture and the principal information technology security
strategist provided detailed accounts of the agency’s architecture implementation. Also, agency architecture
documents were collected and their content analysed as part of the study.
The fourth section outlines the key results of the study as follows:
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•

The federal government’s actions in the area of information security prior to, and post, 9/11.

•

The outputs from the implementation of an information security architecture within Centrelink
using an analytical framework comprised of standards and drivers, architecture components,
architecture domains and views, and business attributes profiling for security.

The final section provides a summary of research findings, research limitations, contributions of the research,
and directions for future research efforts in other organisations.

MOTIVATIONS AND INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS
The following sections discuss the primary motivations for the information security research. Information
security standards, and some example cases of information security compliance in the United Kingdom
government.
Motivations
On 11 September 2001, the terrorist attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York and the
Department of Defence Pentagon building in Washington DC fundamentally transformed the landscape of
information security and government information operations. In what was to become an almost surreal
experience, some Australian defence analysts were monitoring the unfolding events on Cable Network News
(CNN) transmissions, as information flooded in from across the globe. One of the key messages that resonated
from 9/11, and the bombing of the Sari Club in Bali, Indonesia on 12 October 2002, was that Australia is
vulnerable in terms of its critical core infrastructure, particularly in the areas of information and communications.
While acknowledging that others have identified the need to protect critical information infrastructure (Rathmell
1999, 2001; Jones 2002), information is one of the most important inputs to national security activities and
actions, and provides the temporal connectivity between critical events and outcomes. A good example is the
reaction of emergency services and law enforcement agencies when advised of the occurrence of a natural
disaster or unlawful act (eg, bush fires, robberies). The information passed to these agencies act as the trigger for
their action or response. Given the importance of information under these types of circumstances, it might be
argued that governments should systematically protect and secure their information stores.
If we agree that government information stores are an important resource that should be protected, then the
information should be secured at the whole-of-government and individual agency levels. These levels of security
cover the strategic exchange of information between agencies and the security of information within each
individual agency. It should be noted that the Australian government has already developed an Interoperability
Framework that supports the principles of information sharing and exchange, including policies, standards and
guidelines for information operations (Commonwealth of Australia 2003). The underlying motivation for this
study is to examine the strategic policy developed, and procedural actions taken, by the federal government in
relation to secure information exchange, and investigate the security architecture that has been implemented by
one agency to protect their information stores.
Information Security Standards
The information security management standards that are applicable to this study are the ISO/IEC 17799:2000 that
outlines the voluntary code of practice for information security management and the BS 7799-2:2002 that defines
the specification for information security management systems. Both standards are seen as complementary with
the BS 7799 standard instructing users on how to apply ISO/IEC 17799 and build, operate and improve
information security management systems. It should be noted that an equivalent AS/NZS 7799-2:2003 standard
has also been developed by the local Australian and New Zealand standards organisations.
ISO/IEC 17799:2000 defines 127 security controls under the ten major areas of security policy, security
organisation, asset classification and control, personnel security, physical and environmental security,
communications an operational management, access control, systems development and maintenance, business
continuity management and compliance. The controls enable users to identify and deploy safeguards that are
appropriate to their particular business or area of responsibility. This standard emphasises the importance of risk
management (AS/NZS 4360:2004) and stresses that only the relevant security guidelines should be implemented.
The standard covers all forms of information including voice, data and graphics, telephones, fax machines,
electronic commerce and the Internet.
BS 7799-2:2002 specifies how the information security management systems should be built, operated,
maintained and improved. The information security management systems provide the vehicle to measure, monitor
and control security management from a top-down perspective. The standard also specifies the system
compliance path that includes defining the security policy, planning the scope of the system, managing the risk,
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implementing and operating controls, managing resources, initiating system improvements, taking preventative
and corrective actions, and undertaking management review and audit. Again, risk management is emphasised as
a critical element of this standard’s implementation.
Information Security Compliance – Case Studies from the UK Government Environment
Specific to this paper, two case studies from the United Kingdom (UK) government environment demonstrates
the imperatives placed on government agencies and businesses to become BS 7799-2:2002 compliant.
Summaries of the cases are outlined as follows:
The Radiocommunications Agency is an executive agency of the UK government’s Department of Trade and
Industry and is responsible for managing the non-military radio spectrum. Other agency functions include
international representation, allocating spectrum, spectrum licensing, and assuring clean spectrum. The principal
driver of agency information security was the mandate by the Head of the UK Civil Service in November 1999
that required all government organisations to be BS 7799 compliant by the end of 2003. The agency was the first
government organisation to achieve BS 7799-2:2002 compliance, including agency-wide information security
management procedures. BS 7799 compliance also improved security awareness across the agency, particularly
within the senior management group (available from http://www.insight.co.uk/casestudies.htm).
The Stationery Office (formerly Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, HMSO) is a privatised government business
that is the definitive source of official and regulatory information, and has been managing and publishing UK
government information since the 1700s. The security of sensitive client information was the main driver of the
BS 7799 compliance initiative in 2003. The Stationery Office has achieved a BS 7799 compliant IT
infrastructure with business continuity procedures that exceed the standard’s minimum requirements. The
office’s Intranet solution has also improved security awareness across the organisation (available from
http://www.insight.co.uk/casestudies.htm).
The two BS 7799 compliance cases depict the key business drivers, emphasise the corporate direction towards
business continuity procedures, and reinforce the important benefit of enhanced agency-wide security
awareness.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND MODEL
The following sections discuss the development of the Research Question and Model.
Research Question
The Research Question is concentrated on the development of security arrangements for government information
and is posed as follows:
Has the Australian federal government sought to systematically protect and secure their information stores and
exchanges, and if so, what type of security frameworks are available to agencies for securing their information?
The research question looks to determine what types of strategic activities and actions the government has taken
in attempting to secure its information stores and exchanges, while also examining the implementation of a more
tactical, agency-specific security architecture.
Research Model Development
The two-part research context model for this study has been developed using the Zachman Enterprise
Architecture Framework (Sowa and Zachman 1992). The first part of the model is the strategic or whole-ofgovernment information security environment, and is based on the scope or contextual layer of the Zachman
framework (ie, government organisations, business events, business goals, important information, and locations).
The second part of the model is the tactical or individual agency information security environment, and is based
on the business, system, and technology model layers and the detailed representations (component) layer of the
Zachman framework (ie, conceptual, logical, physical, and component elements of the security architecture). The
agency information security architectures are considered to enable the secure storage, transmission and reception
of government information. The research context model is depicted in Figure 1.
The model depicts the bounded whole-of-government information security environment that contains the
government agencies (GA). Each government agency is considered to have developed and applied an information
security architecture (ISA) that secures agency information stores and enables secure information exchanges
between agencies (depicted by the broken line arrows). This study has carefully grounded its research context
model in the published literature of Sowa and Zachman (1992).
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Figure 1: Research context model (based on Sowa and Zachman 1992)

RESEARCH METHOD
This study has used a two-part qualitative research method that includes the use of time line analysis, archival
research and document discovery, unstructured interviews with key information security executives, and public
presentations by agency executives. This method employed data collection from multiple sources, and used
testing and triangulation of the collected data similar to the research programs executed by Burgelman (1983) in
Eisenhardt (1989), and Burgelman (1994).
In the first part of the study, archival research and time line analysis was combined to provide a consolidated
picture of the government information security environment. Archival documents and papers from the National
Office for the Information Economy (now the Australian Government Information Management Office) and the
Attorney General’s Department were reviewed for specific actions and activities undertaken by the federal
government in relation to the implementation of a strategic information security framework. A time line analysis
was then overlayed on the discovered documents with particular emphasis placed on the periods leading into and
out from 11 September 2001.
In the second part of the study, key executives in the area of information security at Centrelink were interviewed
and provided their views on the development and on-going implementation of the agency information security
architecture. The executive commentaries were recorded in field note format. Agency and independent public
audit documents relating specifically to the information security architecture were collected and the relevant
content analysed using text and headings searches and integrated with the executive viewpoints. Also, public
presentations of Centrelink’s enterprise and information security architectures were attended and presentation
notes collected and compared with the other case information. Information for part two of the study was collected
between March 2003 and October 2004.

STUDY PART ONE RESULTS
The following sections describe the key results from part one of the study.
Legal and Legislative Drivers
In 1988, the Australian federal government took its first steps towards securing citizens privacy and individual
information in the broader (including online) environment when the Privacy Act (1988) was passed
(Commonwealth of Australia 1988). This Act set legal markers for the interpretation, definitions and functional
scope of information to be protected under the legislature. The Privacy Act also set out privacy codes,
information privacy principles, national privacy principles, established the Federal Office of the Privacy
Commissioner (including investigative and enforcement powers), and set the guidelines for public interest
determinations.
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The relevance of the Privacy Act (1988) to this study is grounded in the Information Privacy principles, where
the fourth principle outlines the storage and security responsibilities of record-keepers, while other principles (six
through eleven) set out the guidelines for access, disclosure and use of stored information. The implications for
all government agencies (eg, Australian Taxation Office, Health Insurance Commission) that collect, use and
manage client information is the requirement to provide safe and secure storage and protected transmission of
client data between the required points of presence.
Information Security Guidelines and Government Directives
In addition to the legislative drivers, the Australian federal government also developed a number of guidelines
and policies that have application to online and broader IT security. The federal government issued the Protective
Security Manual (PSM) in early 2000, with the manual maintained by the Protective Security Coordination
Centre in the Attorney General’s Department. The PSM is the federal government’s top-level framework for
physical, information and personnel security, and was compiled using a broad-based consultation process
(Commonwealth of Australia 2000b).
It should be recognised that federal government information requiring protection needs to be classified according
to the schema contained in the PSM. The classification system used by the federal government comprises Top
Secret, Secret, Confidential and Restricted for national security material and Highly Protected, Protected and ‘In-Confidence’ for sensitive material (Australian National Audit Office 1997). These national security
classifications are long standing and consistent with other countries. This paper will deal with information in the
sensitive material classification schema only.
A key part of the PSM is the Australian Communications Security Instructions (ACSI) 33. The ACSI 33 provides
the framework for agencies to develop and implement effective Information Technology and website security
processes and practices, with the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) having overall responsibility for issuing and
maintaining the instructions (Commonwealth of Australia 2004). DSD also has administrative responsibility for
the government Gateway Certification Guide (GCG) and the mandatory procedures for portal certification. The
GCG was developed to assure security at all points where the federal government connects to the Internet.
The federal government also requires agencies to use the Gatekeeper (Baltimore Technologies) accredited
products and services when implementing online systems that use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
(Commonwealth of Australia 2004). Security guidelines, products and services adopted by the federal
government are consistent with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Information Security Guidelines that were released in 1992 (OECD 1992) and re-released in 2002 (OECD 2002).
Information Security gathers momentum into 2000
While the Australian federal government had worked steadily to achieve greater levels of information security
since the late 1980s, March 2000 saw further concentration on compliance with specific electronic security
(eSecurity) measures. The federal government declared that all agencies must adopt a minimum set of standard
online requirements that address the important security and privacy elements of existing legislature, and
conformed with existing Commonwealth standards (Commonwealth of Australia 2000a). Specifically,
government agency web sites were to comply with the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 (as modified by the
Privacy Amendment Act 2000), government agencies were to develop an agency-wide information security
policy and plan, and from 1 June 2000, all federal government agencies were to manage online systems and
websites in accordance with ACSI 33.
The federal government also observed a need for all tiers of government to actively cooperate on eSecurity
issues. In supporting this direction, inter-jurisdictional co-operation was to be pursued. It was intended that
agreeing common standards with States and Territories on issues including privacy, security, meta-data tagging
and access principles was a clear priority, and that the former National Office of the Information Economy
(NOIE), now the Australian Government Information Management Office (AGIMO), would lead this
consultation process. AGIMO was formed in April 2004, following the restructuring of NOIE and the returning
of information economics functions to the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the
Arts (Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts 2004).
The multi-tiered government co-operation on information security was an extension of the Online Government
Council (OGC) arrangements that were initiated in January 1997. The OGC is a forum of Federal, State and
Territory Ministers and local government that agrees national strategic approaches to government use of
information and communication services. The OGC is charged with providing leadership to all areas of
government, the private sector and the broader community, in promoting and encouraging cooperative
approaches to electronic communications, as well as a customer-focused approach to electronic service delivery
(Online Government Council 1997).
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The March 2000 electronic security measures mandated by government were tied to the Government’s Online
Strategy “Government Online” that was released on 6 April 2000 (Commonwealth of Australia 2000c). The
strategy aimed to provide an implementation framework for the Prime Minister's 1997 ‘Investing for Growth’
commitment to ensure all appropriate government services are available online by 2001 using a seamless
eBusiness approach (Commonwealth of Australia 1997). The second strategic priority sought to ensure that
‘security enablers’ were implemented in the areas of authentication, privacy and security (eg, passing of the
Electronic Transactions Act 1999).
Government information security momentum continued to build throughout 2000 and in November 2000, the
federal government announced further measures directed at securing government information and data
(Commonwealth of Australia 2000a):
•

NOIE were tasked with a greater co-ordination and awareness promotion role in the online security
domain, including closer working arrangements with the Attorney General’s Department and DSD.

•

Implementations of an enhanced, online incident reporting and response system, to be overseen by
DSD and developed in consultation with appropriate agencies and stakeholders. The system is based
on the DSD Information Security Incident Detection, Reporting and Analysis Scheme (ISIDRAS).

•

Introduction of a protocol for the independent and external certification, auditing/testing and
verification of agency online security.

•

Assurance that non-government services providers or intermediaries who may deliver some
Commonwealth online services (eg, utilise web-enabled customer databases) manage the provision
of those services in accordance with PSM and ACSI 33.

In a move to positively enforce these measures, agency Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) were requested to
warrant that their online assets were managed in accordance with security standards like the ACSI 33 and PSM.
CEOs must also confirm that any non-government online service providers are operating within the PSM and
ACSI 33 guidelines. These enhanced eSecurity measures were to take effect on 1 March 2001.
Accelerated Information Security Arrangements Post 9/11
The implementation of the November 2000 eSecurity measures were well underway when the events of 11
September 2001 transpired. Within two weeks of the attacks on US infrastructure, the Australian federal
government launched new administrative and operational arrangements in strict accordance with the Protection
of Australia's National Information Infrastructure and eSecurity Policy that was released on 27 September 2001
(Commonwealth of Australia 2001). These administrative and operational arrangements focused on the
development of three major groups within a broader eSecurity co-ordination and reporting regime as depicted in
Figure 2 (Note, arrows indicate reporting channels and directions).
Attorney General, Treasurer,
Ministers for Justice,
Customs and Immigration

Full Cabinet and/or
National Security Committee

Heads of Commonwealth
Operational Law
Enforcement Agencies

Secretaries Committee
on
National Security

Action Group on the Law
Enforcement Implications of
Electronic Commerce

Electronic Security
Coordination Group

Critical Infrastructure
Protection Group

Figure 2: Australian Government eSecurity Regime (Commonwealth of Australia 2001)
The Electronic Security Coordination Group (ESCG) is the primary eSecurity policy body that is chaired by
AGIMO and includes membership from the Attorney General’s department, DSD, various security agencies (eg,
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation), and other federal government departments (eg, Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade). The ESCG has been tasked with raising the profile of eSecurity across the Australian
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community, developing information sharing arrangements with industry and government bodies, co-ordination of
international eSecurity activities, and looking forward to the development of eSecurity skills and research
priorities.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Group (CIPG) is a sub-committee of the ESCG that is chaired by the
Attorney General’s department and has the primary role of identifying and providing advice on Australia’s
critical information infrastructure. The CIPG has overseen comprehensive threat and risk assessments on
Australian telecommunications, electricity, banking and finance, and air traffic control infrastructure. The CIPG
continues to work with infrastructure owners to mitigate those key vulnerabilities identified in the assessment
process.
The Action Group on the Law Enforcement Implications of Electronic Commerce (AGEC) is the government’s
peak response body on the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences involving electronic
communications. AGEC is chaired by the Director of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
(AUSTRAC) and includes members from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Australian
Centre for Police Research (ACPR), Australian Federal Police (AFP), various government agencies (eg,
Australian Customs Service), the Federal Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), and the National Crime
Authority (NCA). The AGEC has an ongoing role in developing law enforcement strategies in areas such as
access to email conversations, disclosure of intercepted information, computer intrusion warrants and cooperation between international authorities.
The key relationships between these eSecurity groups are outlined as follows:
•

The AGEC reports directly to the Heads of Operational Law Enforcement Agencies, including
government agency CEOs, police departments chiefs, that in turn reports to senior ministers in the
key law enforcement portfolios. AGEC also provides the results of its studies and research to ESCG
as a ‘primary policy’ input to electronic security coordination.

•

The CIPG is a working sub-committee that continues to progress mitigation strategies on the
infrastructure vulnerabilities identified in the threat and risk assessments discussed earlier. CIPG
reports its progress to the ESCG as a ‘policy implementation’ input to electronic security
coordination.

•

The ESCG reports directly to the Secretaries Committee on National Security (CEOs of the Prime
Minister’s, Defence and Treasury Departments) who consider and pass important policy and
coordination issues forward to the National Security Committee (NSC) or the Full Cabinet of
government.

The relationships demonstrate cooperation and commitment to eSecurity at the three levels of government, and
between a group of law enforcement agencies that have separate state, national or international responsibilities.
These arrangements have been in place since 2001, and noting Australia’s participation in coalition actions in
Afghanistan and Iraq, provide a measure of confidence in the electronic security domain.
A Security Architecture for the Government Environment (SAGE)
In early 2004, the Australian federal government announced its intention to consider the development of a
security architecture for the government environment or ‘SAGE’ (Australian Government Information
Management Office 2004). The architecture could be best described as ‘a set of security policies, standards and
guidelines’ that address how agencies should conduct their business in the exchange and use of information. This
initiative follows from the Management Advisory Committee (made up of federal government agency CEOs)
report Australian Government Use of Information and Communications Technology: A New Governance and
Investment Framework that was released on 15 October 2002 and highlighted the importance of security,
confidentiality, privacy and protection of information (Commonwealth of Australia 2002). Unfortunately,
following further budget restrictions and the restructure of NOIE, the SAGE initiative was terminated in late
2004. A summary of the part one time line analysis is shown in Figure 3.
Privacy Act 1988

OGC Arrangements / PM Statement 1997

OECD Guidelines 1992

Electronic Transactions Act 1999

PSM / Online Strategy 2000

MAC Report / New OECD Guidelines 2002

New measures/ 9/11 /e-Security Policy 2001

Figure 3: Summary of Time Line Analysis (Part One Results)

SAGE 2004
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STUDY PART TWO RESULTS
The following sections describe the key results from part two of the study.
The Centrelink Agency
Centrelink is one of the largest federal government agencies in Australia, employing over 27,000 full time
equivalent staff to deliver over 140 different products and services valued at approximately $55 billion for 25
government agencies, while operating over 1,000 service points from a recurrent annual budget of $1.6 billion
(see www.centrelink.gov.au). Centrelink operates a large Information and Technology (I&T) environment that
includes mainframe computers, mid range electronic business networks, a large desktop computer fleet, twentynine call centres, and a diverse range of software products and solutions. Consistent with its implementation of
the Zachman Enterprise Architecture Framework (Treadwell 2003), Centrelink has implemented the Systems and
Business Security Architecture (SABSA) (Sherwood 2003) in its I&T environment.
Security Standards and Drivers
Centrelink identified the Privacy Act (1988), Social Security legislation, PSM and ACSI33, BS 7799-2:2002, and
the agency eBusiness strategy as the primary standards and drivers in their information security stack (Coates
2004). As noted from the analysis in part one of the study, with the exception of the specific social security
legislation, each standard and driver adopted by Centrelink is consistent with the broader information security
environment established by the federal government. Centrelink stated that the information security stack drives
the six SABSA architecture layers (ie, contextual, conceptual, logical, physical, component and operational) and
the vertical column abstractions (interrogatives) in the areas of assets (what), strategic motivation (why),
processes (how), stakeholders (who), location (where) and timing (when) (Coates 2004). By implementing
SABSA, Centrelink focused on creating components that addressed the assets to be protected, the motivation for
security architecture application, the required security functions, the organisational aspects of security, the
locations where security actions were undertaken, and the temporal nature of security within the agency.
Security Architecture Components
Centrelink identified the three key components of their security architecture as the information security policy,
procedures and products (Coates 2004). These components were consistent with the security architecture
observed and reported to the federal parliament by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) in mid 2001. In
particular, the ANAO found that Centrelink had established strict policies and procedures for controlling logical
access to the use of computing resources supporting pensions and employment benefits, conducted regular
monitoring of user access and changes to access rights, and exercised appropriate security incident handling
procedures. The ANAO also found a number of integrated systems and software products that worked in
combination to secure the I&T environment, including Access Control Facility 2 and SAMS/390 (mainframe
security), and NetWare Directory Services and SAMS (local area network security) (Australian National Audit
Office 2001).
Architecture Domains and Security
Centrelink’s implementation of the Zachman Enterprise Architecture Framework saw the agency establish four
major sub-architectures (ie, business, information, applications and infrastructure domains) (Crisp 2003).
Centrelink stated that the security architecture intersected each of the sub-architectures. Specifically, the
information security architecture embraced all parts of the organisation, including personnel and staffing
(business), security software (applications), corporate information stores (information), and the network,
platforms and facilities (infrastructure) (Coates 2004). This type of approach has built a strong and intimate
connection between the four agency domains and the overall security function. At Centrelink, information
security is a common theme that influences the complete organisation.
Business Attributes and Practices
Centrelink’s implementation of SABSA has also seen the creation of the agency business attributes profile
(Sherwood 2003). Centrelink analysts developed a profile of business attributes that included the user needs,
management features, operational understanding, system characteristics, legal-regulatory environment,
information technology strategy and business strategy (Coates 2004). The attributes profile was an integral part
of the conceptual architecture layer and allowed performance metrics to be developed and measured for
managerial reporting and control. At Centrelink, the attributes profile is analysed using a multi-pass business
process that applies traffic light performance indicators. Agency business analysts generate enterprise views
using no control, existing control and risk mitigation plan implementation scenarios. The results are colour coded
using traffic light indicators and are presented for non-executive board and executive management team review
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and consideration. On the basis of these analyses, agency management decisions are taken and actions
implemented (Coates 2004).

SUMMARY
In conducting this research it was considered important that the timeframes preceding and following 9/11 be
examined in order to determine what strategic information security actions Australian governments were taking
around the time of the terrorist attacks. The time line analysis showed that prior to 9/11, Australian governments
had implemented strict requirements for information privacy under the Privacy Act (1988) and had directed that
government online environments comply with stringent security guidelines (eg, PSM/ACSI 33). In the sixteen
days following 9/11, the Australian federal government moved to strengthen the national information security
framework and implemented a consolidated set of executive management teams, groups and committees to deal
with information and electronic security at the strategic level. The research also showed that the federal
government has given some consideration to implementing a whole of government security architecture for the
protection of government information stores (subject to suitable funding arrangements).
The Centrelink case showed that public sector agencies could successfully implement security architectures
provided they follow certain architectural guidelines. First, the architecture should be based on established
security standards and sound business drivers. This approach should allow the security architecture components
to be integrated with the various parts of the business and organisational structure. Second, agencies should
develop policies, procedures and products that enable an integrated approach to agency-wide security.
Deficiencies in any of these components will leave the agency vulnerable to security threats and risks. Third, the
security architecture should be integrated with the complete agency enterprise architecture in order to build the
security function into all business domains. This integration effort should allow information security to be firmly
established in the complete organisation and form part of its work culture. Fourth, organisations should look to
develop a business profile and understand how the business and security might be coordinated and meshed.
Agency managers can use the business profile to exercise various security and risk management scenarios and
make informed decisions. While other associated actions may also be required, following these four guidelines
would give most organisations a useful start in developing a security architecture.
In summary, the findings of this study are consistent with contemporary empirical research from Meta Group in
the area of information security. Meta Group found that organisations use their information security architecture
to provide a framework of principles, procedures, and management products that enables security solutions,
demonstrate a serious intent to secure information, manage risk, and assure regulatory and legal compliance, and
provide a common vision for information security across the business (Scholtz 2004). While the research was
limited in scope to the Australian government view and one large public sector agency, the results reaffirmed the
on-going importance of information security at the strategic and tactical levels of government, particularly in the
post 9/11 environment. The research also provides a good example of how information security can be
implemented in a large and geographically dispersed public organisation. Future research studies might
investigate the outcomes of information security architecture implementations, including the avoidance, handling
or incurrence of critical incidents.
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